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COMMON-SENSE (FEDERAL) COMMON LAW
ADRIFT IN A STATUTORY SEA, OR WHY
GROKSTER WAS A UNANIMOUS DECISION
Jay Dratler, Jr.t
I. INTRODUCTION: THE Two MISTAKES
The very day the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Grokster,l commentators on the Lehrer News Hour pondered an
interesting puzzle: why a unanimous decision? 2 Grokster was one of
the very last decisions the Court announced in its 2004-2005 term,
and the Court usually decides the hardest cases last. Why, if the case
were so simple as to promote unanimity, were there dozens of briefs
from a gold-plated list of amici, including several groups of law
professors, the State of Utah, two United States Senators, and the
Solicitor General? 3 How did one of the most controversial and
contentious cases in copyright history produce a unanimous opinion?
t Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of Law;
Ph.D. Physics, University of California at San Diego, 1971; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978;
Articles Editor, Harvard Law Review, 1977-78; on-line bio at
http://www.uakron.edu/law/lawfaculty/dratler.php; the author would like to thank his editors at
Law Journal Press, Neil Hirsch and Nancy Stein, for encouraging him to write a third treatise on
cyberlaw, which provided much of the background for this article, and his wife, Aileen Thong,
for her steadfast love, patience, and support.
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. See Day of Decisions (Lehrer News Hour television broadcast June 27, 2005)
(colloquy between Moderator Gwen Ifill and Supreme Court Reporter Jan Crawford Greenburg)
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-juneO5/decisions_6-27.html (last visited
July 3, 2005).
3. The Supreme Court's docket lists sixty-one amicus briefs filed on behalf of such amici
as the United States, the State of Utah, U.S. Senators Patrick Leahy and Orrin Hatch (erstwhile
Chairmen of the Senate Judiciary Committee), Intel Corp., the Commissioner of Baseball, the
performing rights societies ASCAP and SESAC, Inc., various groups of law, computer science
and media studies professors, and such trade associations as the National Academy of Recording
Arts & Sciences, the National Association of Recording Merchandisers, the Intellectual Property
Owners Association, the National Association of Broadcasters, the American Federation of
Musicians of the United States and Canada, the National Venture Capital Association, the
Consumer Electronics Association, Emerging Technology Companies, International Rights
Owners, the Computer and Communications Industry Association, the Internet Archive, the
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I'd like to begin by posing a provocative answer to these
questions. In my view, the entire Grokster litigation on appeal, with
all its Sturm und Drang and many amicus briefs, was based on two
mistakes. Once the Supreme Court had recognized those mistakes, it
was easy to correct them, and to do so unanimously. Doing what the
parties and most amici so desperately wanted the Court to do-revisit
its 1984 decision in Sony-was unnecessary and probably unwise.4
So what were the two mistakes? The first was procedural. Early
in the litigation, the parties made cross-motions for summary
judgment restricted to defendants' present and future activities,
ignoring past actions and past versions of their software. 5 The parties'
precise motivations for this agreement remained unclear, and indeed
appeared to mutate, up to and during oral argument before the
Supreme Court. 6 One thing was clear throughout, however: both
parties apparently viewed Sony as the heart of the case and wanted the
appellate courts to modify or clarify it.7
Whatever their reasons at the time, the parties agreed to frame
their summary judgment motions in this limited way, and the district
Recording Artists' Coalition, the American Intellectual Property Law Association, the Business
Software Alliance, IEEE-USA, and the Video Software Dealers Association. See Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162 (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-480.htm (last visited July 3, 2005).
4. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440-43 (1984)
(borrowing contributory infringement standard from patent law and concluding that "the sale of
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.").
5. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct at 2774.
6. Considering the substantive controversy involved, the oral argument devoted a
surprising amount of time to this procedural issue. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument
at 8-9 29-32, 41-45, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005) (No. 04-480) available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argumenttranscripts.html (last visited July 3,
2005) [hereinafter Grokster Oral Argument].
7. At oral argument, the plaintiffs refused to rest their case entirely on an inducement
theory, even when the justices suggested that they could win on that basis. When asked by
Justice O'Connor if that theory would dispose of the case, plaintiffs' counsel responded that it
was "a basis for resolving this case, but not to the exclusion of getting the law right on Sony."
Grokster Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 17, lines 16-17. Solicitor General Clement, although
recognizing that "an active-inducement ground [was] a narrow way to decide the case," also
suggested that the Court "might have to say something about the Sony issue before it reached
that issue." Id. at 22, lines 1-4. See also, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776-77 (plaintiff "has tailored
its principal claim to our opinion" in Sony); id. at 2778 ("The parties and many of the amici in
this case think the key to resolving it is the Sony rule and, in particular, what it means for a
product to be 'capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses."' (internal citation
omitted)).
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court did not object. 8 Perhaps it should have. What resulted was a
summary judgment not on a claim or cause of action, but on a legal
theory or set of facts. At oral argument, the defendants insisted that an
inducement-to-infringe theory was not before the Supreme Court but
remained for adjudication below, regardless of remand.9 The
plaintiffs, beginning to understand that reliance on Sony might be
risky, vigorously objected. 1° Justice Souter described this state of
affairs as "bizarre.""l I Chief Justice Rehnquist overcame his
intubation to ask whether the summary judgment motion had asked
for dismissal of a claim but never got a satisfactory answer. 12
Thus the parties, by trying so hard to arrange for a "test case" for
revisiting Sony, neglected a basic principle of civil procedure: that
judgments are on claims or causes of action, not legal theories or sets
8. See Grokster, at 2774 ("The District Court limited its consideration to the asserted
liability of [defendants] for distributing the current versions of their software, leaving aside
whether either was liable 'for damages arising from past versions of their software, or from
other past activities."' (quoting district court in Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).
9. See Grokster Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 30, lines 4-8 (defendants' counsel
argued that the inducement theory was "not here, because [it] was explicitly part of the
[defendants'] past activities, removed from the District Court decision" and not a subject of the
interlocutory appeal); id. at 30, lines 22-25 (arguing that plaintiffs remained "entitled to argue
[the inducement theory], back in the District Court, without a remand, because that issue
remains in the District Court"); id. at 41, lines 3-9, at 42-43 (to same effect).
10. The plaintiffs' apparently had agreed to this "bizarre" division of the cause of action
in both courts below. Yet their disagreement at oral argument before the Supreme Court is quite
clear. See id. at 50-51 (plaintiffs' rebuttal). Apparently plaintiffs feared that an inducement
theory, if limited to defendants' past acts and software, could not support injunctive relief
against defendants' continuing facilitation of their customers' massive infringement-relief that
was patently plaintiffs' chief goal in the litigation:
[T]he [defendants'] position here is that we can sue for specific infringements
that we can show were induced by these specific acts, such as e-mail support.
Our position on inducement is that we are entitled to injunctive relief against the
continued operation of this gigantic infringement machine, which was built by
the inducement.
Id. at 51, lines 1-7 (plaintiff's counsel).
11. Id. at 45, line 3. See also id. at 30 at 15-16 (observing that granting summary
judgment on an inducement theory would be implausible to a non worldly degree). See also id.
at 42, lines 1-2 (Justice Stevens stating, "I'm still a little puzzled about the posture of the case").
12. See id. at 47, lines 13-15; id. at 47-49. Justice Rehnquist asked the defendant's
counsel whether the district court's summary judgment had dismissed a particular legal claim;
counsel answered "no," in essence, explaining that the "claim" at issue had been split into
fragments based on (1) present and future facts and software and (2) past facts and software,
apparently by agreement of the parties and with the district court's acquiescence. See id. at 48,
lines 2-5 ("The other side eventually agreed that [the 'claim' subject to summary judgment] was
distinct and severable from their claim of secondary liability as to past acts and as to past
versions of the software.").
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of facts. 13 The ghastly confusion in terminology in this field perhaps
aided and abetted this error. 14 In any event, the Court unanimously
rejected their "test case" ploy and decided the case based on the
theory that the defendants had tried at least temporarily to ignore:
inducement to infringe. 15
The second error was related but more fundamental. Both parties
and two courts-the district court and Ninth Circuit-apparently
forgot that secondary liability in copyright law is a matter of federal
common law.16 They applied the rule of Sony as if it were a statutory
prescription, rather than a common-law construct based on a
particular set of facts. That is, they tried to construe Sony as an
invariable rule of immunity from secondary liability, which applies
whenever the defendant provides something capable of substantial
noninfringing use. 17
The Court readily recognized this error. Sony, it noted, had
nothing to do with inducement to infringe and therefore was
inapplicable to a theory of inducement, 18 which is a separately
cognizable theory of secondary liability at federal common law. 19 In
13. See Grokster Oral Argument, supra note 6.
14. See discussion infra Part IV(A).
15.
Because Sony did not displace other theories of secondary liability, and because
we find below that it was error to grant summary judgment to the companies on
[plaintiffs'] inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony further, as [plaintiff]
requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between
protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with
knowledge that unlawful use will occur. It is enough to note that the Ninth
Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave
further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
See also id. at 2770 ("We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."). See also infra
note 83.
16. See discussion infra Part II. See also id. at 2776 (describing two federal-common-law
rules discussed infra as "doctrines of secondary liability [that] emerged from common law
principles and are well established.").
17. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 ("The Ninth Circuit has read Sony's limitation to
mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be
held contributorily liable for third parties' infringing use of it."); Grokster Oral Argument, supra
note 6, at 52, lines 18-20 (plaintiffs' counsel, characterizing defendants' argument as "a rule of
immunity").
18. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778, ("the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony, which it
read as limiting secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the case applied").
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an unusually clear and unanimous opinion, it held that there was
enough evidence of inducement in the record to overturn summary
judgment for the defendants on an inducement theory without even
considering Sony. 20 It therefore reversed and remanded for a ruling on
that theory.2 1
After all the briefing on Sony, six concurring justices could not
resist giving some guidance on it, but they split three to three.22 In the
end, only three out of nine justices would have made it possible to
impose secondary liability under Sony, and they would have done so
largely on evidentiary and procedural grounds. 23 All nine agreed that
19.
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a
model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible
one for copyright. We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.
Id. at 2780.
20. In its unanimous opinion, the Court found three evidentiary factors "particularly
notable." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781-82
(2005). First, each defendant had each "showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of
demand for copyright infringement, the market comprising former Napster users." Id. at 2781.
Second, "neither [defendant] attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to
diminish the infringing activity using their software." Id. at 2782. Third, the defendants'
business model depended on advertising revenue, "the extent of the[ir] software's use
determine[d] the gain to the distributors, [and] the commercial sense of their enterprise tum[ed]
on high-volume use, which the record show[ed was] infringing." Id. at 2782 (internal citation
omitted). The Court cautioned that neither the second nor third factors could support a finding of
infringement by itself, but it did not so restrict the first factor. See id. at 2781 & n. 12. It thus
left the impression that deliberately facilitating massive infringement by taking over the
customer base of an enterprise built on infringement could, in itself, constitute actionable
inducement to infringe. See id at 2780-82. In any event, based on all three factors, it held
"[tihe unlawful objective.., unmistakable." See id. at 2781-82 & n.12.
21. See id at 2782-83.
22. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, saw the
evidence of noninfringing use in the record anecdotal and speculative and therefore
insufficiently "substantial" to support summary judgment for defendants under the Sony
standard. See id. at 2785-87 (Ginsburg J., concurring, Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J. joining).
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices O'Connor and Stevens, reviewed the very same evidence and
found it sufficient to satisfy the Sony standard and support summary judgment. See id. at 2787-
89 (Breyer, O'Connor & Stevens, JJ., concurring). They further opined that the apparent 10%
of non-infringing use, while perhaps not sufficient if "fixed for all time," should "serve[s] as an
adequate foundation [for nonliability] where there is a reasonable prospect of expanded
legitimate uses over time." Id. at 2789 (internal citation omitted). The latter three justices
viewed the "real question" as whether the Court should modify the Sony standard or interpret it
more strictly, and ultimately answered that question in the negative. See id. at 2790-91, 2796.
23. See id. at 2786-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J. joining).
These Justices concluded only that evidence in the record-that infringement by users was
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Sony was irrelevant to the main legal theory on remand: inducement
to infringe.24 Therefore Sony remains good law, virtually untouched
except for better explication of its rationale.25
In pointing out the mistakes made in this litigation, I do not
mean to imply any criticism of the parties, their counsel, amici, or the
lower courts. This field of law is confusing, and terminological chaos,
discussed below, exacerbates the confusion. 26 Despite teaching these
very subjects at least twice per year in different courses, I did not
fully appreciate the significance of these mistakes until after reading
several briefs, the oral arguments, and the Supreme Court's decision.
But recognizing mistakes-even with the blessing of hindsight-is
the beginning of wisdom, and these particular mistakes have much to
teach us about secondary liability for copyright infringement. This
paper is dedicated to their lessons.
II. MISTAKING FEDERAL COMMON LAW FOR STATUTORY
PRESCRIPTIONS
The last lesson-that secondary liability is copyright in a matter
of federal common law-is by far the most important. Copyright is
an exclusively statutory field,27 and Congress has nearly total
discretion to shape it at will.28 Yet Congress does not always speak-
massive and constituted 90% of the actual use of defendants' technology-was at least sufficient
to overturn summary judgmentfor defendants under Sony standard. Id.
24. See supra notes 18, 19. See also id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, Rehnquist, C.J.
& Kennedy, J. joining) (explicitly concurring with unanimous opinion that inducement is
separately cognizable theory); Id. at 2787 (Breyer, O'Connor & Stevens, JJ., concurring)
(explicitly agreeing with unanimous opinion that "the distributor of a dual-use technology may
be liable for the infringing activities of third parties where he or she actively seeks to advance
the infringement" and that "in light of our holding today, we need not now 'revisit' Sony).
25. Justice Breyer's concurrence, in particular, laid out the rationale of Sony-protecting
innocent technology innovators from chilling fear of secondary liability for copyright
infringement-in some detail and at some length. See id. at 2790-96.
26. See discussion infra Part IV(A).
27. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)
("long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, it was settled that the
protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory.... The remedies for infringement 'are only
those prescribed by Congress' (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 661-62 (1834), and
Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889)).
28. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) ("it is generally for Congress, not the
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives" (citation omitted)); id. at
208 (Supreme Court is "not at liberty to second-guess" Congress' "rational enactment"); id. at
204 (if the statute does not violate the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" requirement, it need
only be "a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause");
Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 ("It is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of
[rights] that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate
access to their work product.").
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let alone speak clearly-on every issue. Secondary liability is a prime
example; if Congress spoke at all on the subject, it mumbled
inaudibly. In contrast to patent law, which explicitly sets out causes of
action for inducing infringement, contributory infringement, and
related offenses at some length, the copyright statute contains no
explicit definition of any form of secondary liability.29 The closest it
comes is a brief exegesis in the House Report on the concept of
"authorizing" infringement under Section 106.30
When Congress is mute or unintelligible on an important point in
an otherwise comprehensive statutory scheme, it is up to the courts to
fill in the gaps. Doing so is neither judicial legislation nor judicial
activism. Rather, it is an exercise in developing federal common law,
within the interstices of federal statutes, universally recognized as
legitimate, notwithstanding Erie.31
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (cause of action for inducing patent infringement); 35 U.S.C. §
271(c) (defining contributory infringement); 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(d) (defining further acts of
contributory infringement and excluding some); § 271(f) (defining as infringement producing
components of product or process for assembly or use abroad); § 271(g) (defining as
infringement importing or selling product made abroad by patented process). See also Sony,
464 U.S. at 434 ("The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement
committed by another"). Since Sony, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act has recognized the
possibility of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement but has not
attempted to define them. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2) ("Nothing in this section shall enlarge or
diminish vicarious or contributory liability for copyright infringement in connection with any
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof') (emphasis added).
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (Sept. 3, 1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674:
The exclusive rights accorded to the copyright owner under section 106 are 'to do
and to authorize' any of the activities specified in the five [sic: now six]
numbered clauses. Use of the phrase 'to authorize' is intended to avoid any
questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. For example, a person who
lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if
he or she engages in the business of renting it to others for purposes of
unauthorized public performance.
See also Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17:
The lack of clarity in this area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an
infringer is not merely one who uses a work without authorization by the
copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work
without actual authority from the copyright owner.
Subject to exceptions, "the owner of copyright... has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of' six listed activities with respect to a copyrighted work, namely, reproduction,
adaptation (preparing derivatives), distribution, public performance, public display, and digital
audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 413-14 (1964) (discussing development of federal common law relating
to implied causes of action under securities laws and regulations).
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Problems arise, however, when courts are not conscious of what
they are doing. Common-law decision making is inevitably ad hoc. It
relies on general principles of justice and common sense. Its tools are
analogy and distinction based on facts. By using these tools, courts
mimic--on a much smaller scale and for a much smaller subset of
factual contingencies-the comprehensive factual inquiries that
legislatures are supposed to undertake before prescribing more
comprehensive and general rules in statutes. In contrast, statutory
interpretation is a detailed and specific exegesis of existing rules,
aided by logic, deduction, and a detailed "paper trail" of history and
legislative intent. In their modes of thinking, procedure and analysis,
not to mention sources of legal authority, the two processes are
different enough to be characterized as wholly different disciplines.
It is vital for both litigants and the courts to consider under what
circumstances each is appropriate. When a statute speaks on a subject
and comes close to giving an answer, but requires extrapolation to
new or unanticipated circumstances, statutory interpretation is
appropriate. In contrast, when the statute is silent and the legislative
history suggests a huge open issue, perhaps throwing out a few
random examples, federal-common-law analysis is appropriate.
The latter is precisely the case with respect to secondary liability
for copyright infringement. The statute contains only three code
words-"and to authorize"-and the House Report explains that these
words import, among other things, recognition of contributory
infringement.32 The House Report further throws out a quick example
of contributory infringement, which is obviously intended to be
illustrative, not exhaustive.33 Today, with the passage of nearly thirty
years and the explosive advance of technology, this example appears
a bit quaint. Furthermore, as the Sony Court itself noted, the law of
secondary liability in copyright was not well developed at the time,34
32. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 30.
33. See id.
34. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-39
(1984) (reviewing lack of explicit statutory guidance, outlining and distinguishing early cases,
and concluding):
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact
that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its
customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of
vicarious liability on such a theory. The closest analogy is provided by the patent
law cases to which it is appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship
between patent law and copyright law.
See also id. at 435 (noting "[t]he lack of clarity in this area").
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although the bar and Congress had worked assiduously for some
decades to rationalize the doctrine of contributory infringement in
patent law.3 5
The conclusion was inescapable that Congress invited the courts
to fill a huge gap in copyright with federal common law. Yet the
courts would have had to step in even without an invitation. For, as
the Supreme Court recognized in Sony, "vicarious liability is imposed
in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory
infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying
the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another."36  Whether invited by
Congress or not, the Supreme Court felt it had a duty to recognize and
apply the universal principle of law that there are circumstances under
which A may be liable for B's tort.3 7
35. For an excellent and comprehensive review of the process by which the "staple
article" doctrine developed in patent law-a process that took several decades and required
congressional intervention-see Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,
187-223 (1980).
36. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435.
37. Several participants in the conference questioned my conclusion that the Sony Court
had self-consciously made federal common law, rather than interpreting the copyright statute.
Having studied Sony off and on for over twenty years, I saw that conclusion as self-evident.
There are at least five good reasons for it. First and foremost, the Sony Court had no
relevant statutory language to interpret. The words "and to authorize" in Section 106-the sole
statutory "hook" in the 1976 Act on which to hang secondary liability, see supra note 30 -
hardly applied in their plain meaning to Sony's activities. Sony did nothing to "authorize"
infringement by users of its video tape recorders. On the contrary, it included a warning against
copyright infringement in its instruction manuals. See infra note 59.
Second, the Sony Court explicitly acknowledged the lack of relevant statutory
guidance. It began the key section of its analysis with a flat statement that "[t]he Copyright Act
does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another." Sony, 464 U.S.
at 434. The Court itself thus recognized that it was writing on a blank slate.
Third, although the Court adverted to the statute's "and to authorize" language, it
mentioned it only in passing (in a footnote), see supra note 30, and did not even pretend to
interpret it. Instead, the Court launched into a discussion of relevant precedent, see Sony, 464
U.S. at 435-38 & n.18, which the Grokster Court later explicitly acknowledged as having
"emerged from common law principles[.]" See supra note 16. Furthermore, all the cases that
the Court discussed had been decided under the previous copyright statute (the Copyright Act of
1909), so the Court could hardly have used them to "interpret" the 1976 Act's language even
had they been relevant.
Fourth, the Sony Court ultimately distinguished all of the precedent it discussed as
irrelevant to the question before it. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435-38 (distinguishing Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911)); Sony, 464 U.S. at 437-38 & n.18 (distinguishing
dance-hall and department-store cases). It thus found the wells of both statutory language and
precedent dry. See id. at 439:
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact
that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its
customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
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Problems arise, however, when the courts, in developing federal
common law on a case-by-case basis, promulgate rules with the
specificity and apparent authority of statutory prescriptions. Then
litigants and other courts may be thrown off the scent of common-law
analysis and treat the holdings of federal-common-law decisions like
statutory text capable only of narrow exegesis in a process akin to
statutory interpretation.
This appears to have been precisely what happened in Grokster.
Indeed, it appears to have been characteristic of the whole field of
secondary liability in copyright during the time period leading up to
that decision.
For several years now, I have put the following three rules on the
blackboard at some point in both my copyright and cyberlaw classes:
Rule 1: Vicarious liability exists where a defendant has the right
and ability to control copyright infringement, derives direct
financial benefit from the infringement, and does not stop it.
Rule 2: A defendant is liable for contributory infringement when
he knows of copyright infringement (actually or constructively)
and induces, causes or materially contributes to it.
material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of
vicarious liability on such a theory.
On this point also the Court saw itself as breaking new ground.
The final reason for concluding that the Sony Court was making federal common law
was its stated rationale for its decision. It drew the standard for contributory infringement that it
ultimately announced, not from the statute it was purporting to interpret (the copyright statute),
but from a statute on another subject entirely-patent law. See id. ("There is no precedent in the
law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on [the asserted] theory. The closest
analogy is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to refer because of the
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law."). Furthermore, in applying patent
principles, the Sony Court took pains to distinguish trademark law as insufficiently analogous,
and ultimately founded its application of patent principles on sound policy. See id at 439 n. 19
("We have consistently rejected the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright
law and trademark law."); id. at 442 ("The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a
balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-
protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce.").
Viewed thus as a whole, the Sony Court's reasoning is impossible to characterize as
statutory interpretation, at least if that term has any stable meaning. The Court began with a
brooding omnipresence-the general principle of secondary liability "imposed in virtually all
areas of the law[.]" See id. at 435. Finding no relevant statutory language and relegating the
scant legislative history to a footnote, the Court then proceeded to analyze precedent under a
prior statute on the same subject, again to no avail. Finally, the Court borrowed a principle from
another statute entirely, picking and choosing what statute to borrow from and relying heavily
on common sense and good policy as it did so. Any resemblance of this process to statutory
interpretation, which normally involves close attention to the text of the statute and the intent of
Congress expressed in congressional reports and floor debates, was purely coincidental.
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Rule 3: A defendant who supplies a product, service or technology
used by others to infringe copyrights is liable for contributory
infringement unless what he supplies is capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.
Cognoscenti will immediately recognize these three rules as
having impeccable pedigrees at federal common law. Rules 1 and 2
derive from the Shapiro and Gershwin cases, 38 as followed and
applied in decisions such as Fonovisa, Napster I, and others. 39 Rule 3
is just the relevant holding of Sony, expressed backwards to make it
parallel to the other rules in grammatical form.40 When stated in this
manner, these rules appear to have the specificity and authority of
38. Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)
("When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest
in the exploitation of copyrighted materials--even in the absence of actual knowledge that the
copyright monopoly is being impaired.., the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated
by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation" (citing De Acosta v.
Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied sub nom. Hearst Magazines v. De Acosta 325
U.S. 862 (1945))). The Shapiro case is generally considered the origin of the modern doctrine of
vicarious liability in copyright. See JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM § 6.01[21[b][ii][C] (Law Journal Press, 2000 & Supps.)
[hereinafter DRATLER CYBERLAW]. See also Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing Shapiro's development of "[tihe concept of vicarious
copyright liability... as an outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior").
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) ("one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer"). The Gershwin case is the origin of the modern doctrine of contributory infringement
in copyright. See DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at § 6.01[2][b][ii][B]. See also
Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 264 (describing doctrine as arising out of theories of enterprise
liability).
39. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-64 (describing doctrines of vicarious liability and
contributory infringement as arising out of Shapiro and Green cases, cited supra note 38).
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc,, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (Napster 1) (applying
doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious liability in litigation against peer-to-peer
file sharing system offering centralized indexing server). There are many other cases following
and applying these rules. For those that involve new technology, see, e.g., In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
1069 (2004) (holding provider of peer-to-peer file-sharing software liable for contributory
infringement); Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communication Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73, 1375, 1377, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (granting summary judgment
refusing to hold Internet service provider directly or vicariously liable for hosting bulletin board
system on which infringing material was posted by another, but setting issue of contributory
infringement for trial because it depended on disputed evidence of service provider's
knowledge); Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
845-46 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (holding providers of "black box" cable TV decoders secondarily
liable). See also Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 & n.9, (reciting two rules and their origins).
40. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440-42
(1984).
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statutory prescriptions. Indeed, Rule 3 and part of Rule 2 have actual
statutory counterparts, albeit in other laws. 41
Yet statutory prescriptions they are not. For one thing, they have
problems of consistency that no competent statutory drafter would let
slip by. Rules 2 and 3 describe the same cause of action-
contributory infringement-in different terms, and nothing explains
their relationship. Is Rule 3 an exception to Rule 2, a special case of
Rule 2, or another rule altogether?
This was precisely the issue in Grokster. The Ninth Circuit had
decided as if Rule 3 (the holding in Sony) was an exception to Rule 2,
providing immunity from contributory infringement liability
whenever the defendant's products are capable of substantial
noninfringing use.42 The correct answer, however, is that Rule 3
(Sony) is a special case of Rule 2, applicable only to facts analogous
to those of Sony, which did not address inducement to infringe.43 The
Grokster Court so ruled unanimously, 44 but this conclusion also
should have been apparent from Sony itself, which had both
recognized and distinguished the precedents on which Rule 2 is
based.45
41. Cf 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2005):
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
This is the patent statute from which the Sony Court "borrowed" to create Rule 3. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 440-42, (quoted in part supra note 4). See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) ("Whoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer").
42. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778
(2005), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 16-17.
43. See id at 2779 (unanimous opinion; footnote omitted):
[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent [to induce
infringement] if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose
rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.... Thus, where
evidence goes beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be
put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability.
44. See id. at 2770, 2778, 2780, discussed in supra text accompanying notes 15-21. See
also supra note 43.
45. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 437-38 & n.18 (outlining facts and holdings of, inter alia,
Shapiro and Green, and describing them as cases in which "the 'contributory' infringer was in a
position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without
permission from the copyright owner"); id. 464 U.S. at 437-38 (concluding that "[t]his case,
however, plainly does not fall in that category"). See also supra note 37.
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Not only do the three rules as stated have problems of
consistency; they also have problems of scope. Are the three rules
illustrative or exhaustive? Might there be forms of secondary liability
other than vicarious liability and contributory infringement, or does
any form of secondary liability have to fit into one of the stated
pigeonholes? 46 Again, the rules by their terms give no answer. The
rules' specificity and air of authority hint that they are exhaustive, but
a cautious common-law court might well give a contrary answer,
based on common sense and the process of case-by-case adjudication.
"These rules," it might reason, "list all the kinds of secondary liability
that we have found so far. We suspect that infinitely fertile human
imagination and the advance of technology may create other
situations in which it would be just and proper to impose secondary
liability, so we decline to declare these three rules exhaustive." Isn't
that what the common law, whether federal or state, is all about?
I hasten to say that this analysis does not disparage expressing
the holdings of cases in abstract form. Nor does it require common-
law courts to report decisions on secondary liability as a bare
collection of facts and results (secondary liability vel non). Attempts
to state holdings of cases as legal rules, or to summarize prior
developments in the law are not only helpful; they are a tried and true
part of the common-law process.
Moreover, stated rules can serve important policy functions. As
the defendants and amici pointed out,47 and as all nine justices in
46. Confusion in using these terms, discussed infra in Part IV(A), exacerbates the need for
clarifying their scope. Even in discussing the Rule 2 cases, the Sony Court mixed up the two
terms. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 ("In [previously discussed] cases, as in other situations in
which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the 'contributory' infringer was in
a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without
permission from the copyright owner") (emphasis added).
47. Not surprisingly (since the human and commercial aspects of their case were not
particularly attractive), the defendants devoted over half their brief to abstract arguments based
on the alleged technological and economic efficiency of peer-to-peer file-sharing, the policy
importance of the Sony standard in protecting technological innovation from the "chilling
effect" of potential copyright liability, and the alleged need to "hold the line" on that standard.
See Brief for Respondents Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. at 6-8 (discussing P2P
efficiencies), 16-18 (explaining practical and economic significance of Sony's rule), 21-33
(applying rule's protective effect, justifying that effect, and refuting arguments for various
possible modifications to rule), 40-50 (arguing that any modification should be left to Congress),
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480),
available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/home.html (last visited July 4,
2005). See also id. at 15 (Summary of Argument) ("This Court could afford petitioners relief
only by expanding the general standards of secondary liability, with inevitable collateral harm to
numerous industries beyond the present P2P context"). See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005) ("[Plaintiffs] and many of the amici fault the
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Grokster seemed to recognize, 48 the rule of Sony performs an
extremely valuable policy function: protecting innocent technological
innovators from a "chilling" fear of copyright litigation.49 That is no
doubt why the entire Grokster Court seemed quite happy to leave the
Sony rule virtually intact.50
What this analysis does suggest is that, notwithstanding the clear
expression of abstract rules-which, like those above, can be facially
inconsistent and nonexhaustive-courts and litigants should recognize
that secondary liability in copyright is quintessentially a matter of
federal common law. As such, it requires not just deductive logic, but
common-law analysis through analogy and distinction.
Some may think that common-law analysis is far too uncertain
and wishy-washy to provide the clarity and certainty that lawyers and
businesses need in the digital age. But, perhaps paradoxically,
analogy and distinction when properly applied can create greater
certainty than application of an abstract rule. In my copyright and
cyberlaw classes, I often do an experiment with my students. First, I
put the three rules for secondary liability on the blackboard, much as
outlined above.51 Then I give them the facts of a case they have not
yet read. Next, I ask them to apply the abstract rules to the stated
facts and to decide whether or not secondary liability is appropriate.
Then I ask them to analogize or distinguish the stated facts from
precedents they have studied, typically the landlord-tenant cases (no
secondary liability),52 the department-store cases (liability exists
Court of Appeals' holding for upsetting a sound balance between the respective values of
supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in new
communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement.").
48. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 (unanimous opinion) ("We are, of course, mindful of
the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of
technologies with lawful and unlawful potential.").
49. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion contains perhaps the best explanation of this
policy function. See id. at 2792-96 (Breyer, concurring). See also id. at 2791 ("Sony's rule, as I
interpret it, has provided entrepreneurs with needed assurance that they will be shielded from
copyright liability as they bring valuable new technologies to market.").
50. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
52. See Shapiro Bemstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)
(where a landlord:
leas[es] his property at a fixed rental to a tenant who engages in copyright-
infringing conduct on the leased premises and .... the landlord lets his premises
without knowledge of the impending infringement by his tenant, exercises no
supervision over him, charges a fixed rental and receives no other benefit from
the infringement, and contributes in no way to it, it has been held that the
landlord is not liable for his tenant's wrongdoing.
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where the store receives a percentage of an infringing
concessionaire's sales) and the dance-hall cases (finding liability
when an owner profits from infringing performances even in the
absence of knowledge or choice of specific music played).53 Finally, I
ask them to decide again. Invariably, the exercise of analogy or
distinction produces greater consensus and more uniform, consistent,
thoughtful and ultimately correct results. This experience, oft repeated
with the same results, has given me an abiding faith in the accuracy
and predictive power of the common-law process as practiced by
English and American courts for centuries.
Strict Sony-ites swear by the alleged certainty and clarity of the
rule in that case, insofar as it protects innocent technological
innovators both from losing improper lawsuits and having to bear the
expense of defending them.54 But is the "rule" of Sony really so
certain?55 Sony left important questions unanswered. How much non-
infringing use is "substantial" enough to avoid liability for
contributory infringement? Parts of Sony suggest that the less-than-
(citing Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938), and Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 F. 592
(S.D.N.Y.1918))).
53. See Shapiro Bernstein, 316 F.2d at 308 (imposing vicarious liability upon department
store for concessionaire's sale of bootleg records where store reserved right to supervise and
dismiss concessionaire's employees and took 10 - 12% of its sales revenue as concession fee).
Cf Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding flea-
market operator vicariously liable for vendor selling counterfeit records where operator reserved
right to control and exclude vendors and sale of counterfeit records acted as "draw" from which
operator received per-customer admission fees and fees from parking and concessions). The
Second Circuit collected these cases in Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d
304, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1963), describing them as follows:
[T]he cases are legion which hold the dance hall proprietor liable for the
infringement of copyright resulting from the performance of a musical
composition by a band or orchestra whose activities provide the proprietor with a
source of customers and enhanced income. He is liable whether the bandleader is
considered, as a technical matter, an employee or an independent contractor, and
whether or not the proprietor has knowledge of the compositions to be played or
any control over their selection.
(citation omitted).
54. See supra note 4. For example, the defendants in Grokster argued that virtually every
conceivable variation of the Sony rule would produce a greater risk of liability for innocent
technological innovators and therefore a greater chilling effect on innovation. See Brief for
Respondents Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. at 24-33 (applying rule's protective
effect, justifying that effect, and refuting arguments for various possible modifications to rule),
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480),
available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/home.html (last visited July 4,
2005).
55. See supra note 4; see supra text accompanying notes 37-38 ("Rule 3").
428 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
10% of authorized noninfringing use there by itself may be enough.56
Yet the Court went on to discuss private, noncommercial time-
shifting as fair use, which was by far the most predominant use.57
Thus did Sony spawn a quantitative controversy that persists to this
day. 58 Yet if one looks at Sony as a whole, one sees a case in which
the producer was wholly innocent and the vast majority of uses of its
product turned out to be fair. That data point certainly does not tell us
much about a case like Grokster, in which it was undisputed that the
vast majority of uses had already been adjudicated as infringing and
the defendants' "innocence" was not even plausible.59
56. In addressing noninfringing uses of the VTR there at issue, the Sony Court first
discussed permissive or authorized time-shifting, i.e., the recording for later viewing of
television programs whose producers either did not mind or actively encouraged that practice.
See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443-47 (1984). In its
summary of the facts, the Court had noted that a survey had found the proportion of such
permissive use to be 7.3% for sports programs alone (whose producers testified they did not
mind later viewing). See id. at 424. Later, analyzing the legal significance of this and other
authorized time-shifting, the Court concluded:
[I]f there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of televised sports
events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs such as Mister Rogers'
Neighborhood, and if the proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the
business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not
be stifled simply because the equipment is used by some individuals to make
unauthorized reproductions of respondents' works.
Id. at 446. The Court thus implied that permissive or authorized time-shifting alone (at a level
of 7.3% plus) could constitute the "substantial noninfringing use" sufficient to preclude
imposition of contributory liability. Id. at 456.
57. See id. at 447-55. Since unauthorized time-shifting was by far the predominant use of
the equipment at issue, this holding made it easy to rule that the equipment was capable of
substantial noninfringing use and therefore that its vendor satisfied the standard for avoiding
contributory liability. See id. at 456. The Court never explained whether it went on to analyze
the larger (unauthorized) category of use because the smaller (authorized) category was
insufficient by itself to meet the no-contributory-infringement standard, or whether it did so
because the question of users' potential liability was so burning as to demand departure from the
usual practice of deciding cases on the narrowest possible ground. Either view is fairly
supported by the text of the Court's opinion.
58. At oral argument in Grokster, Justice Ginsburg also doubted that the "rule" of Sony is
clear. ("There is a statement--one could take it as clear-'capable of substantial noninfringing
use.' That would be very clear, I agree. But Sony goes on for 13 more pages. If the standard
were all that clear, it would have stopped there. And usually when you're interpreting a
document, one rule is, you read on, and if you read on, you find we need not give precise
content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. That doesn't sound very
clear to me.").
59. In an effort to make the facts of Grokster appear closer to those of Sony, the
defendants' Supreme Court brief noted that Sony had refused to promulgate an advertisement
warning of copyright infringement for fear of hampering their marketing of the new VCR
technology. See Brief for Respondents Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. at 18 n.9,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480),
available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/home.html (last visited July 4,
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The quantitative issue-how much noninfringing use is
"substantial"--is not the only point of Sony that is unclear and
requires further exegesis. What does it mean to say that a technology
is "capable" of substantial noninfringing use? Should the courts look
at existing uses, nascent uses, probable future uses, possible future
uses, or all of the above? The six justices whose separately concurring
opinions reached the Sony standard split three to three on that very
issue, i.e., on whether the record demonstrated sufficient likelihood
and magnitude of "capability" to satisfy the standard.60 Yet in their
unanimous opinion, all justices agreed that it was unnecessary to
answer these questions to decide the case on an inducement theory.61
That reticence was entirely appropriate for an exercise in federal
common law. Not only would answering the open quantitative
questions have involved matters of fact, prediction and speculation
inappropriate for a common-law court; the advance of relevant
technology and changes in media businesses are so rapid today that
such an exercise likely would be futile even for a legislature. This is
why it is preferable to have technology-independent copyright
legislation based on broad, general principles with a faint hope of
remaining timeless, at least in the medium term. 62 The many briefs in
Grokster, arguing every aspect of these questions and asking that they
be decided finally here and now, amply demonstrate how far the
alleged "clear" rule of Sony is from being immune to legal dispute. 63
2005). Yet Sony's instruction manual had contained a clear warning against infringement-a
point that the Sony majority itself had mentioned. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 426: "Sony's
advertising was silent on the subject of possible copyright infringement, but its instruction
booklet contained the following statement: 'Television programs, films, videotapes and other
materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such material may be contrary to the
provisions of the United States copyright laws."' (quoting district court's opinion, 480 F. Supp.
429, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1979)).
60. Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775, 2786 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reviewing
"motley collection of declarations" and one survey and concluding that it provided only
"anecdotal" evidence insufficient to support summary judgment for defendants) with id. 125 S.
Ct. at 2788-90 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reviewing evidence of existing uses and trends in future
use and finding sufficient evidence of substantial noninfringing use to affirm summary judgment
for defendant under Sony standard alone).
61. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
62. See, e.g., DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38.
63. For these and other reasons, Justice Scalia advised the defendants' counsel in oral
argument that "[t]his Court is certainly not going to decide this case on the basis of stare
decisis,... whatever else is true." Grokster Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 34 lines 15-17.
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III. THE BEAUTY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
In contrast, consider how easily the courts might have disposed
of Grokster by analogy and distinction. As Grokster was argued
before the Supreme Court, its key facts pertained to inducing users to
infringe. (For procedural and other reasons, that was not how the case
was argued below. The reasons for the discrepancy, which relate to
the first mistake discussed above, are peripheral here.) As the
Supreme Court saw it unanimously, the Grokster defendants had
consciously decided to serve Napster's old customer base of 50
million infringers. 64
Neither the Court nor the parties, however, noted an additional
highly significant fact. Once the copyright litigation against Napster
had put it out of business, Napster's customers could no longer
infringe musical copyrights. 65 The reason was that, as the Ninth
Circuit in Grokster had so carefully described, Napster's system had a
centralized index of song file names without which its P2P software
was useless. 66 By providing Napster's former users with file-sharing
software that did not use or require a centralized index, the Grokster
defendants not only took over Napster's infringing customer base;
they also made it possible for those customers to infringe again.
The defendants therefore not only knew that massive
infringement was the primary use of their technology and the result of
their "stepping in" after Napster's demise. Their entire business
model, which depended solely on revenue from advertising and
therefore on maintaining the broadest possible customer base, would
have made no sense if limited to non-infringing users.67 As these facts
suggest, the entire enterprise in which the Grokster defendants
participated involved, from the outset, massive infringement of
copyrights in songs, and that enterprise was the primary, if not the
sole, raison d' etre of their business. In a glaring contrast to Sony,
users' claims of fair use, when adjudicated, 68 were found wanting.69
64. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2773, 2780-81.
65. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (Napster III)
(affirming preliminary injunction and shutdown order).
66. See Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158-60
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded by Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
67. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
68. The timing of this adjudication relative to the defendants' culpable acts is not entirely
clear. The Supreme Court notes only that defendants began operations after Napster was sued
for contributing to infringement. See id. at 2772-73 (noting that "[a]fter the notorious file-
sharing service, Napster, was sued by copyright holders for facilitating copyright infringement,"
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Now compare the facts of Sony:70  A foreign manufacturer
created an innovative product for recording television programs off
both respondents promoted and marketed themselves as Napster alternatives) (emphasis added).
But the Napster litigation had been decided, rejecting the fair use defense (at least for purposes
of a preliminary injunction), years before the Grokster litigation reached the Ninth Circuit, let
alone the Supreme Court. See infra notes 69, 75.
69. No court has ever found one-to-many file-sharing of music among consumers fair use.
See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (Napster 1) (for
purposes of preliminary injunction, rejecting defense of fair use for users' file sharing in
general, as well as for sampling and "space-shifting").
The reason should be obvious: unlike time-shifters in Sony, who postpone their
individual viewing of a freely broadcast television program to a later time, P2P file sharers can
(and often do!) share copyrighted songs with their 10,000 closest friends. That sharing not only
undermines the chance that any of those friends will ever buy a CD containing a shared song; it
also directly creates unauthorized competition with any system for downloading songs that the
copyright owners later might set up. It thus severely impacts what the Nation Court called the
"potential market" for the copyrighted work, and what all nine Justices in that case designated as
the most important factor in the fair use calculus. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (ruling that market effect factor contemplates potential as
well as actual markets); id. at 566 ("This last [market effect] factor is undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use") (footnote omitted); id. at 602 (opinion dissenting on merits
but observing that "[t]he Court correctly notes that the effect on the market 'is undoubtedly the
single most important element of fair use' (citation omitted)).
One participant at the conference wishfully objected that the Nation Court's
unanimous endorsement of market effect as the most important fair use factor was a passing
fancy, never repeated. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Supreme Court has decided
only one other fair-use case since Nation, and there the Court unanimously reiterated the
importance of market effect, remanding for a determination of that very issue. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593-94 (1994) (remanding for determination whether rap
parody of classic rock song affected market for "legitimate," nonparody rap version of same
song and noting "it is impossible to deal with the fourth [market effect] factor except by
recognizing that a silent record on an important factor bearing on fair use disentitled the
proponent of the defense ... to summary judgment.").
Moreover, theory suggests precisely why the market effect is so important. The
doctrine of fair use depends upon balancing the social benefit that otherwise infringing uses may
have against copyright's incentive for creativity, for which a particular copyright owner's
market returns are a proxy. Copyright statutes in civil-law countries, which attempt to
encapsulate the federal-common-law doctrine of fair use in explicit statutory terms, recognize
this balance. For example, the Russian statute, while permitting a number of specific
unauthorized uses of a computer program or database, including reverse compiling-in a sort of
statutory enumeration of specific fair uses-states that those uses "must not cause unjustified
harm to the normal use of the computer program or database and must not impair in an
unwarranted way the lawful interests of the author or other owner" thereof. Law on Authors'
Rights of 1993, Article 25(3), reprinted in The Kommersant, No. 18, May 3-9, 1993 at 26.
(translated by author). Thus, both fundamental copyright policy (in the form of incentives for
creativity) and coordinate foreign law recognize that an adverse impact on the copyight owner's
market (and hence on the incentive to create) is the standard against which any alleged social
benefit of fair use must be measured. A social benefit achieved at the cost of undermining the
incentive to create is inconsistent with the purpose of copyright.
70. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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the air.71 There was no precedent for using that product-infringing
or noninfringing-because nothing similar to it had ever before
existed. Now contrast these facts to Grokster's situation: willfully
taking over a business model (Napster's) that already had been the
subject of suit and was later adjudicated as unlawful at both the
distributor (secondary) and user (primary) levels!72 In addition, Sony
had been made aware of the risk of copyright infringement and
warned users against infringing in its instruction manuals. 73 Its
business model had been based solely on sale of its equipment; it did
not really know or care what that equipment would be used for.
Indeed, it had no way of knowing for sure because the product was
unprecedented. Sony's business was not part of a massively and
consciously infringing enterprise; on the contrary, the predominant
use that ultimately emerged, when challenged in court, was held
fair. 74
Forget, for a moment, about legal theory, i.e., whether to apply
the label "contributory infringement" or "inducement to infringe."
Think only about secondary liability: is there any question that these
two cases are distinguishable on their facts? Moreover, is there any
question that liability in Grokster would be fair and appropriate even
if liability in Sony were not? Does it really matter, in this context, that
Grokster's file index was decentralized? 75
71. In comparing the facts of Sony with those of Grokster, it is also useful to keep in mind
that suit against Sony was filed in 1976. See id at 419. There is a vast historical and cultural
gulf between Sony in the mid 1970s and the savvy, "Silicon Valley" Grokster defendants of
2001. In those days, Japanese firms like Sony were foreign in every sense of the word. Their
key executives were virtually all Japanese; they did virtually no domestic manufacturing; they
communicated internally almost entirely in the Japanese language; and they knew virtually
nothing about the peculiarities of American law, let alone copyright law. For example, Fujitsu's
allegedly flagrant copying of IBM's software, apparently oblivious to copyright, resulted in a
famous secret arbitration over which Larry Lessig presided. If that case reflected the general
state of awareness of Japanese business, it is likely that Sony was completely unaware of the
relevance of copyright to its technological advance until so advised by American counsel. What
a difference from grabbing (as customers) some 50 million accused infringers left stranded after
Napster was forced out of business by copyright litigation!
72. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (Napster II)
(affirming preliminary injunction and shutdown order at distributor level for contributory
infringement); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (Napster
1) (for purposes of preliminary injunction, rejecting defense of fair use and finding users' file-
sharing direct infringement).
73. See supra note 59.
74. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 ("When the[ relevant] factors are all weighed in the
'equitable rule of reason' balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports the District
Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.").
75. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162-63
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that defendants lacked sufficient knowledge of infringement to be
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Now make an analogy to Aimster, in which the Seventh Circuit
upheld a finding of secondary liability.7 6 There, as in Grokster, the
defendant apparently sought to exploit the same customer base of
infringers left homeless after Napster's litigation-induced demise.77
There, as in Grokster, the defendant explained how to use its
technology to infringe. 78 There, as in Grokster, the defendant had a
business model dependent on infringement for its revenue. 79 Indeed,
Aimster got revenue in part from a "club," with dues of $4.95 per
month, to whose members it gave links to the most-shared hits,
virtually all copyrighted music.80 Is there any doubt that the facts of
Grokster are, as a whole, incomparably closer to those of Aimster
than to those of Sony? Interestingly, Aimster's P2P system, like the
Grokster defendants' but unlike Napster's, appears to have been
decentralized,8 ' but the Seventh Circuit did not even mention that
contributorily liable because their systems' decentralized file indexes prevented them from
knowing, even in theory, what song copyrights their users were infringing), vacated and
remanded by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
76. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004). See id. at 652-55 (for purposes of preliminary injunction,
holding P2P file-sharing service to be contributory infringer, but declining to rule on question of
vicarious liability).
77. See id. at 645 ("Aimster is one of a number of enterprises (the former Napster is the
best known) that have been sued for facilitating the swapping of digital copies of popular music,
most of it copyrighted, over the Internet.").
78. The "big picture" of Aimster's modus operandi is best conveyed in Judge Posner's
own words:
In explaining how to use the Aimster software, the [defendant's] tutorial gives as
its only examples of file sharing the sharing of copyrighted music, including
copyrighted music that the recording industry had notified Aimster was being
infringed by Aimster's users. The tutorial is the invitation to infringement that
the Supreme Court found was missing in Sony. In addition, membership in Club
Aimster enables the member for a fee of S 4.95 a month to download with a
single click the music most often shared by Aimster users, which turns out to be
music copyrighted by the plaintiffs. Because Aimster's software is made
available free of charge and Aimster does not sell paid advertising on its Web
site, Club Aimster's monthly fee is the only means by which Aimster is financed
and so the club cannot be separated from the provision of the free software.
When a member of the club clicks on 'play' next to the name of a song on the
club's Web site, Aimster's server searches through the computers of the Aimster
users who are online until it finds one who has listed the song as available for
sharing, and it then effects the transmission of the file to the computer of the club
member who selected it. Club Aimster lists only the 40 songs that are currently
most popular among its members; invariably these are under copyright.
Id. at 651-52.
79. See id
80. See id
81. See id. at 646-47.
434 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 1.J. [Vol. 22
fact, no doubt because Aimster's club added a centralized component
and because there was extensive evidence of inducement. 82
The moral of this story is that secondary liability in copyright is
federal common law, and the common-law process works extremely
well if only the courts would use it. Had courts and litigants simply
compared the facts of Grokster to those of previously decided cases,
including Sony, Napster I, and Aimster, they would have had little
trouble deciding on which side of the line the accused activities in
Grokster fell. Instead, they got themselves all wound up interpreting
an abstract rule from Sony, which in the end didn't even apply.
The reason why the common-law process works well in these
cases is that they are nearly always multidimensional. In contrast, an
abstract rule like Sony's is unidimensional: what is the relative
importance of infringing and non-infringing use? All the amici's
ruminations about technological innovation, the need to protect it
from chilling copyright litigation, and how strong or clear the Sony
rule needs be to serve that purpose were beside the point. The essence
of Grokster was another question entirely: did the defendants
consciously build their businesses on massive infringement and
encouraging more of it, and, if so, should they be secondarily liable
for doing so? The Supreme Court properly answered the second
question in the affirmative and sent the first one back down for
adjudication. 83
There is one other advantage of common-law adjudication that
bears mention. For some reason unfathomable to me (who was trained
first as a scientist and engineer), the legal mind is drawn to
technological details like a moth to a flame. Hence you will find
almost all of the Ninth Circuit's factual discussion in Grokster
devoted to the defendants' decentralized indexing systems and their
82. See id at 651-52.
83. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780:
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a
model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible
one for copyright. We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.
See id. at 2782. Although the Supreme Court remanded the case, its own analysis of the
evidence of inducement left little room for doubting that the defendants would be held liable for
inducement on remand. See id. at 2780-82 (reviewing the evidence); id. at 2782 ("The unlawful
objective is unmistakable"). Indeed, the Court all but invited the court below to grant plaintiffs
summary judgment. See id. at 2782 ("There is substantial evidence in [plaintiffs] favor on all
elements of inducement, and summary judgment in favor of [defendants] was error. On remand,
reconsideration of [plaintiffs] motion for summary judgment will be in order.").
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distinction from Napster's centralized servers.84  But these
technological details were hardly the essence of Grokster. Rather, the
essence of that case was that defendants had deliberately,
systematically and quite consciously built their business on users'
massive infringement (either contemporaneously or soon to be
adjudicated as such). Obsessive focus on technical detail, like
obsessive focus on Sony as a rule of immunity, prevented appreciating
the big picture virtually until the case was argued in the Supreme
Court. (Because the parties purported to reserve the inducement
theory for later proceedings, 85 I was unaware that there was a
substantial issue of inducement until after reading the oral argument.)
If nothing else, a common-law approach is preferable to a serial focus
on abstract rules in cases like this because it intrinsically considers the
big picture in making analogies and distinctions, thereby avoiding the
colossal waste of judicial resources and amici's effort that this
obsessive and counterproductive focus on technical detail entailed.
IV. POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES WITH FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Of course, no legal approach, even the much-tested common
law, is a panacea. There will always be questions and problems. If
the law adopts the approach suggested here and focuses on factual
analogies and distinctions, rather than abstract rules that may be
inconsistent or non-exhaustive, what problems can we expect? In my
view, there are three.
A. Terminology and Mistaking Facts for Causes ofAction
The first and most immediate problem is one of terminology. As
the Grokster Court itself recognized (quoting Sony), the terminology
in this field is a mess. 86 It is even more of a mess if one considers all
of intellectual property, not just copyright.
84. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1157-60
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
85. See supra Part 1.
86. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 n.9 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984)):
We stated in [Sony] that "the lines between direct infringement, contributory
infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn".... Reasoned
analysis of [the Sony plaintiffs' contributory infringement claim] necessarily
entails consideration of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded
under the other labels, and indeed the parties ... rely upon such arguments and
authority in support of their respective positions on the issue of contributory
infringement.
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The primary culprits are the terms "vicarious liability" and
"contributory infringement." These two terms imply some sort of
exclusivity, which may or may not be accurate.87 In addition, as the
Supreme Court has recognized, courts use them inconsistently. 88
Rules 2 and 3 above (i.e., the second of the two "traditional" or
"common-law" rules and the rule of Sony) use "contributory
infringement" inconsistently-the very problem that created the
question of immunity in Grokster.89 The Supreme Court itself, in
Sony, contributed to the confusion by using "vicarious liability" at
times as a generic term for all kinds of secondary liability. 90 To add to
the confusion, inducement in patent law is a separate offense with its
own statutory subsection, 91 while in copyright law it is a species of
contributory infringement under the "traditional" or "common law"
rule (i.e., the non-Sony Rule 2 above)-a rule that Grokster
reinforced. 92
87. Exclusivity may exist only if, as the Court appears to have ruled, inducement is a
subset of contributory infringement. See infra note 92. For the Court made clear in Grokster
that inducement and vicarious liability are different theories. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776
n.9 ("Because we resolve the case based on an inducement theory, there is no need to analyze
separately [plaintiffs'] vicarious liability theory.").
88. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17
(1984):
The lack of clarity in this area may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an
infringer is not merely one who uses a work without authorization by the
copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work
without actual authority from the copyright owner.
See also, supra note 30.
89. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. See supra text accompanying notes 41-
45.
90. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 ("For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all
areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader
problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable
for the actions of another"); id. at 437 ("In [previously discussed] cases, as in other situations in
which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the 'contributory' infringer was in
a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without
permission from the copyright owner.") (emphasis added). But cf Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776:
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may
be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct
infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the
copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious
infringement.
(emphasis added).
91. See35 U.S.C. §271(b).
92. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 ("One infringes contributorily by intentionally
inducing or encouraging direct infringement") (citing Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). See also supra text
accompanying notes 37-38 (Rule 2).
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If it were up to me, I would junk all the terms "inducement,"
"'vicarious liability" and "contributory infringement" in referring to a
legal cause of action and use a single, consistent term-"secondary
liability"-for all claims of this kind. I would then relegate the terms
"vicarious liability," "contributory infringement," and "inducing
infringement" to factual theories of liability, not claims or causes of
action. Then a complaint pleading "secondary liability" would permit
proof of all these theories (or any others that the federal common law
later might devise), and summary judgment for defendant would
require negating all of them. At the present time, however, plaintiffs
are best advised to use all three terms in their complaints (insofar as
factually applicable), and defendants are best advised to be specific in
their denials.
Why does terminology matter? Does not a rose by any other
name smell as sweet? Not in the law it doesn't. For these
inconsistently used terms designate claims or causes of action, which
are the basic units on which the doctrines of res judicata, summary
judgment and appealing only final judgments operate. Classifying
different but related fact patterns as different causes of action can
create enormous opportunities for procedural shenanigans and traps
for the unwary, especially when the terminology is as confusing and
inconsistent as in this field.
The Grokster case well illustrates this point. In the district court,
the parties tried to "split the baby" of secondary liability by making
cross-motions for summary judgment restricted to the defendants'
present and future conduct and software, excluding past acts. 93
Apparently, the defendant at least thought that this procedure reserved
the question of inducement to infringe for later proceedings without
remand, while tagging the Sony issue for summary adjudication and
appeal. 94 On oral argument before the Supreme Court, however,
several justices could not understand how to split a claim for
secondary liability based on past and present/future facts, since past
acts, particularly those relating to inducement, can influence present
93. See supra Part 1.
94. The defendants' brief argued vociferously that the issue of inducement was not before
the Supreme Court. See Brief for Respondents Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc., at
34-37 (arguments under heading "Claims Of Contributory Infringement Liability For Urging
Infringement Or Assisting Specific Known Acts Of Infringement Are Not Before This Court")
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480),
available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/home.html (last visited July 4,
2005).
438 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
and future infringement. 95 Plaintiffs' counsel then reluctantly agreed
that inducement was relevant to the claim for contributory
infringement, 96 and the Court ruled on that basis. 97 Moreover, it
specifically ruled that inducement is a species of contributory
infringement, a ruling consistent with some earlier lower-court
formulations, 98 thereby permitting it to reverse summary judgment for
defendant on the contributory infringement claim, even though the
parties apparently had agreed earlier that the inducement claim would
be adjudicated separately at the district-court level. As this brief and
confusing history shows, the Grokster case itself is a poster child for
rationalizing the terminology, and therefore the procedure, for
adjudicating claims of secondary liability in copyright law.
B. "Holding the Line" of Sony
The second future problem that might arise from a common-law
approach is "holding the line" on Sony. As Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Grokster explains at some length,99 and as the Court's
unanimous opinion acknowledges,100 the rule of Sony helps protect
innocent technological innovators against the risk and cost of
ultimately spurious copyright litigation. It does so by attempting to
insure that a purveyor of technology that is capable of substantial
noninfringing use will not be liable for contributory infringement.
Yet this rule's alleged clarity and security are debatable
regardless what approach is taken. The lawyers' weasel words
"capable" and "substantial" require interpretation-and often
prediction and speculation. 101  They therefore create ample
95. As Justice Souter explained to defendants' counsel:
I don't understand how you can separate the past from the present in that fashion.
One, I suppose, could say, "Well, I'm going to make inducing remarks Monday
through Thursday, and I'm going to stop, Thursday night.' The sales of the
product on Friday are still going to be sales which are the result of the inducing
remarks Monday through Wednesday. And you're asking, in effect-you're
asking us-to ignore Monday through Thursday.
Grokster Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 30, lines 10-20. See also id. at 32, lines 14-16 (Justice
Kennedy: "it just seems to me that what you've done before bears on what you know, or have
reason to know, on an ongoing basis").
96. See supra note 10.
97. See supra notes 17-21; supra note 83.
98. See supra note 38.
99. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2790-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 2780 ("We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on
regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful
potential.").
101. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61.
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opportunity for dispute and litigation, as the concurring opinions in
Grokster show. 102
There is also a more fundamental problem with "holding the
line" by means of the abstract test of Sony. Focusing on its weasel
words, "capable" and "substantial," is at best a two-dimensional task,
not a multidimensional exercise as a common-law test should be.
Again, Grokster illustrates the point. The defendants there quite
plausibly argued, against a paucity of evidence of then-current non-
infringing use, that peer-to-peer file sharing is just in its infancy, and
that a whole host of valuable, economically efficient, non-infringing
uses were likely to develop and indeed beginning to do so. 1 03 The six
concurring justices who split three-three on the Sony question laid out
the evidence pro and con this point at some length, 104 amply
illustrating both how contentious such issues can be and how hard
they are to pin down in an environment of explosive technological
advance and rapidly changing business circumstances.
This whole contentious argument, however, missed the big
picture in this case. It addressed only the one-dimensional Sony
inquiry whether the defendants' peer-to-peer technology was
"capable" of substantial non-infringing use now or in the future, but it
neglected the big picture that any common-law court, viewing the
case as whole, would instantly recognize. The main question in
Grokster was whether it should be liable for building its business
predominantly, consciously and deliberately upon present
infringement, including the vast horde of flagrantly infringing Napster
refugees. The one-dimensional inquiry arising from the word
"capable" in Sony's abstract holding could not possibly capture all the
relevant angles.
Nor could that word do better in the general case. Suppose many
unforseen uses of a new technology develop, but the defendant
consciously induces, encourages or builds its business predominantly
upon the infringing ones because, for example, they involve less
complex technology (and therefore lower costs) or higher average
102. See supra note 22.
103. See Brief for Respondents Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc. at 6-8
(arguing technological and economic efficiency of peer-to-peer file sharing), 21-24 (arguing
then-current noninfringing uses), 24-26 (arguing that relaxation of Sony rule would threaten
future innovation exploiting efficiency of peer-to-peer technology for distribution of files)
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480),
available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/home.html (last visited July 4,
2005).
104. See sources cited supra note 22.
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transaction amounts (and therefore greater revenue). Should the
defendant get off scot free simply because its technology is "capable"
of substantial non-infringing use in the abstract? Not if traditional
notions of fault, culpability and personal responsibility have any
relevance in the twenty-first century. 105 In the end, emphasizing the
static and one-dimensional wording of an abstract rule over a
multidimensional, holistic approach will only add more complexity
and uncertainty, as litigants attempt to squeeze common sense and
common-law notions of responsibility into abstract pigeonholes that
were never designed to accommodate them.
C. Drawing the Line Between Inducement and Innocent
Innovation
The final problem raised by the common-law approach is related
to the second, but is perhaps more serious. In explicitly recognizing
105. Direct copyright infringement is a strict-liability offense, independent of intent or
culpability. See Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931):
Intention to infringe [a copyright] is not essential under the Act.... And
knowledge of the particular selection to be played or received is immaterial. One
who hires an orchestra for a public performance for profit is not relieved from a
charge of infringement merely because he does not select the particular program
to be played. Similarly, when he tunes in on a broadcasting station, for his own
commercial purposes, he necessarily assumes the risk that in so doing he may
infringe the performing rights of another.
(citation omitted). See also De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 410-12 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied 325 U.S. 862 (1945) (upholding damage liability of allegedly "innocent" publisher who
relied on author's impressive research and warranties):
Th[e] body of authority shows a unanimity of view which is impressive; we
cannot find in it any suggestion of a distinction that one type of innocent copying
is less 'direct' than another or that innocent copying by newspapers and
magazines acquires a protection not accorded to book or gravure printing,...
This result is not surprising.... [T]he protection accorded literary property
would be of little value if it did not go against third persons, or if, it might be
added, insulation from payment of damages could be secured by a publisher by
merely refraining from making inquiry.
In contrast, secondary liability for copyright infringement involves an assessment of the
secondary defendant's state of mind and culpability. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) ("one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer"). If nothing else, the
Supreme Court in Grokster corroborated this well-established point in its very holding, which
emphasized the inducing defendant's purposeful state of mind. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005) ("We hold that one who distributes
a device with the object ofpromoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties."). See generally, DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, §
6.01 [2][b][ii].
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secondary liability for inducing infringement, the Grokster Court
necessarily softened the immunity rule of Sony, at least insofar as it
might be read in the abstract. 106 After Grokster, a provider of
technology that is capable of substantial noninfringing use may still
be secondarily liable for others' infringement using that technology if
it induces, encourages or promotes their infringement. 107 Thus, the
potential for inducement liability necessarily reduces the clarity and
absoluteness of protection for technological innovators that some saw
inherent in the Sony rule.
This problem, however, is by no means unique to a common-law
approach. Common sense suggests that the apparent absoluteness of
Sony would have had to bend to accommodate deliberate inducement
in any event. Surely, few believe that even Sony itself would have
won its case if, for example, it had heavily promoted, advertised and
demonstrated the use of its equipment to copy and distribute to others
programs whose copyright owners objected to such an enterprise.
There was always an inherent risk that Sony would not protect
innovators who consciously and deliberately foster infringing use of
their products or technology. The only serious question was where to
draw the line.
It seems to me that a common-law process will draw this line far
more quickly, clearly, and comprehensibly than an abstract rule like
Sony's, which seduces the mind into an illusion of certainty through a
unidimensional, pseudo-quantitative principle that, in real life, can
never really be accurately quantified. The common-law process of
106. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779:
[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such
evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability
derived from the common law.... Thus, where evidence goes beyond a
product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses,
and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's
staple-article rule will not preclude liability.
See also id at 2778 ("[The Ninth Circuit's] view of Sony. . . was error, converting the case from
one about liability resting on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory.").
107. See id. at 2778 (unanimous opinion):
Because Sony did not displace other theories of secondary liability, and because
we find below that it was error to grant summary judgment to the companies on
[plaintiffs'] inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony further, as [plaintiff]
requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between
protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with
knowledge that unlawful use will occur. It is enough to note that the Ninth
Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave
further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.
See also supra note 83.
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analogy and distinction, proven in courts of law for hundreds of years,
promises to draw the line better and faster than any attempt to parse
the meaning of terms like "capable" and "substantial" in the abstract,
especially against a background of accelerating change in technology,
recording media, and the relevant industries.
The historical background of Grokster corroborates this point.
For several years, the music industry has been petitioning Congress
for "remedial" legislation to address the massive infringement of its
copyrights that peer-to-peer file sharing (P2P) and other new
technologies have permitted. Its lobbying efforts met with strong
resistance, and Congress did nothing. 108 Two factors motivated that
resistance. The first was the very need for speculation on uncertainties
that makes the abstract rule of Sony so malleable. Opponents argued
that no one could predict how the industry would develop and that
producers could turn the tide of infringement if only they would
"catch the wave" of new technology and modify their distribution
systems to exploit it. The second point of resistance was industry and
public skepticism of the motives of producers, who have resisted
virtually every change in media technology from the player piano to
P2P. Indeed, American producers managed to kill entirely a
transitional new technology, digital audio tape, by resistance and
lobbying that eventually produced the stillborn Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992.109
So producers sought "justice" from Congress for several years
and got nothing. Then, in desperation, they sought relief from the
courts. Lo and behold, the Supreme Court gave them relief in the
form of a broad ruling that inducing infringement is actionable, even
in the Internet age. Moreover, the Court did so more quickly and far
more simply and comprehensibly than any legislation might have
done (certainly if recent amendments to the copyright statute are any
model!), and it did so as a matter of federal common law. 110 Isn't
108. Its effort did produce some bills with provisions that were never enacted into law.
See, e.g., S.2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sen. Hatch, June 22, 2004) (bill proposing new 17
U.S.C. § 510(g) to do exactly what Grokster Court did at federal common law: create a cause of
action for inducing infringement); H.R. 4007, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (Rep. Smith, March
31, 2004) (provision that would have amended 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) to criminalize certain acts of
willful copyright infringement without regard to commercial motive); H.R. 5211, 107th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Rep. Berman, July 25, 2002) (bill proposing new 17 U.S.C. § 514, which would have
allowed copyright owners, without liability, to use technological self-help to defeat peer-to-peer
file sharing as long as their doing so did not damage users' data).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 122-134.
110. See PartV.
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there a lesson here about the value of federal common law in our legal
system?
The beauty of the common-law process is that it flows flexibly
with time. It does not attempt the impossible task of making accurate
general predictions about the future of technology, the media or
copyright-related industries in a world that has already seen at least
ten generations of recording media in a century. 11 Instead, it
develops on a case-by-case basis in tandem with technology and the
industry, adding judicial "data points" in the form of facts and legal
results useful for analogy and distinction-and occasionally simple,
comprehensible general rules-as time goes on.
Already we have several data points of relevance: (1) Napster I,
in which secondary liability was based in part on defendant's
maintaining on its servers a list of copyrighted music to infringe; 112
(2) Aimster, in which liability was based on a tutorial and a club with
monthly dues that encouraged infringement of specific copyrighted
works; 11 3 and (3) Sony, in which the uses to be made of the product
were unknown at the time it was introduced, the prospects for future
use were wide, and the vast majority of existing uses turned out to be
authorized or fair. 114 Soon we will have a new data point: Grokster on
remand. If the Supreme Court's clear dicta are any guide, 115 there will
be liability there, based upon the defendants' taking over a vast base
of customers who were infringing, advertisements showing how to
infringe, and a business model designed in conscious reliance on
infringement for a substantial portion-if not the vast majority-of its
revenue. 116
These data points are hardly exhaustive, but they do give an
innovator considerable specific guidance on secondary liability in a
complex and rapidly changing world. If the facts of her case are
closer to Napster I, A imster and Grokster than they are to Sony, then
111. Since Edison's original recording invention, the following media have been used to
record sound, including songs: (1) wax cylinders, plastic disks rotating at (2) 78 revolutions per
minute (RPM), (3) 45 RPM, and (4) 33 RPM, (5) magnetized wire, (6) magnetic tape, (7)
cassettes containing magnetic tape, (8) digital compact disks (CDs), (9) digital "versatile" disks
(DVDs), and (10) MP3 files on portable hard drives.
112. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (Napster
I) (holding that Napster's centralized index of names of infringing files gave it knowledge of
infringement sufficient to satisfying one prong of "traditional" test for contributory
infringement).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.
115. See supra note 83.
116. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780-82.
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she is probably going to be liable. There are of course already other
cases than those mentioned here, 1 7 and the common-law process will
create still more-and therefore further certainty-at time goes on.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court has provided, in clear
dictum in Grokster, some guidance on the limits of an "inducement to
infringe" theory. First, merely producing a product or technology and
supporting it with maintenance and updates is not inducement to
infringe."i8 Second, the Grokster Court was careful to limit reversal
of summary judgment to the combination of relevant facts in
Grokster, not any one alone. 119 It thus encouraged analysis of all the
facts and the big picture, rather than narrow focus on any single
circumstance or any one-dimensional standard.
Apart from avoiding interminable abstract debate, a focus on
common-law analogies and distinctions would have an important
procedural and jurisprudential advantage. It would reduce the
obsessive focus on technology and its unpredictable future course to
the exclusion of human, business, and economic factors that may be
equally or more compelling. Here again, Grokster is a prime
example. The two sets of concurring justices (three each) spent much
ink speculating on the future of peer-to-peer technology and its
present uses not contained in the record. 120 Their speculation would
have been relevant to the question whether the defendants'
technology was capable of substantial noninfringing use had Sony
been relevant, but the case really turned on the plaintiffs' claim that
the defendants had consciously and deliberately built their business
upon users' massive infringement-a claim that could be decided
largely without probing the delicate entrails of technology or
attempting vainly to predict its future course. The Court's common
sense, common-law acknowledgment that motive, culpability and
responsibility do still matter in the "New Economy" made the law not
only more coherent with common understanding but less dependent
117. See supra note 39.
118. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 (citation to Sony omitted):
[J]ust as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the
VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of
infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to
subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product
distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates,
support liability in themselves.
119. Seeid. at2781-82.
120. See sources cited supra note 22.
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upon elucidating esoteric technologies and prognosticating their
future.
V. THE DISMAL RECENT HISTORY OF STATUTORY PRESCRIPTIONS
In the very same field of copyright, two recent statutory projects
have shown the waste, uncertainty and inefficiency that attend futile
congressional attempts to predict and/or micromanage the unknown
and likely unknowable future course of technology. I have written
extensively about both elsewhere, so I will not belabor the point
here. 121 Yet a brief review of each is in order, simply to demonstrate
the point, which may be counterintuitive to some, that the common-
law process can provide greater clarity, certainty and predictability in
the law than a vain attempt to specify and control all possible future
contingencies in advance through statutes.
The first of the failed statutes was the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992.122 Its primary impetus was a wish by Japanese
manufacturers to introduce digital audio tape (DAT) into the United
States. As the first technology allowing consumers to make perfect
digital copies of songs, DAT scared the daylights out of music
producers and copyright owners. With threats of litigation, they
delayed the introduction of DAT technology into the United States
until several years after it had become widely used and immensely
popular in Japan. After years of industry negotiation, representatives
of the user, consumer, and producer industries got together in Europe
and hammered out a "settlement agreement" to be enacted into
legislation to resolve the standoff.123 Their draft ran 57 pages, with a
121. See generally DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38 (discussing Digital Millennium
Copyright Act); 2 JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL,
CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 6.01[5][f][i] (Law Journal Press, 1991 & Supps.)
(discussing Audio Home Recording Act of 1992) [hereinafter DRATLER IP].
122. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (Oct. 28, 1992), codified at 17 U.S.C. Ch. 10, §§
1001-1010. See also H.R. Rep. No. 873, Part I, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 17, 1992), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578 (intellectual property aspects of legislation); H.R. Rep. No. 873,
Part 11, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 21, 1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3600 (trade-
related aspects of legislation).
123. The statutory text reflected two private agreements. The first occurred in July 1989 in
Athens, Greece, after worldwide negotiations between record companies and makers of
recording equipment; it introduced the principle of mandated, technological copy control. See
H.R. Rep. No. 873, Part I, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (Sept. 17, 1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3579-80. The second agreement was a detailed pact among record
companies, hardware manufacturers, songwriters, music publishers and performing rights
societies reached in June 1991; it established the essential elements of the ultimate legislation,
including the home copying exemption, royalty rates, and the basic division of royalties. See
H.R. Rep. No. 873, Part I, at 12 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3582.
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37-page technical appendix. 124 After some cutting and revision by
congressional staff to about half the original length, Congress rubber-
stamped this private agreement and made it law. 125
The details of the 1992 Act need not detain us long. It created a
grand scheme for solving the problem of potential piracy that DAT
created. 126 It allowed consumers to make noncommercial, private
digital and analog copies at will, 127 in exchange for (1) a requirement
that all recording and copying equipment contain technology designed
to prevent serial copying (making digital copies from digital
copies), 128 and (2) an elaborate statutory scheme for collecting
royalties on equipment and media and distributing them to copyright
owners, performers and artists. 129
In theory, the 1992 Act was a fine statute. It allowed consumers
to do what they like to do without hindrance, while providing "front
end" compensation of copyright owners and creators in a way
transparent to consumers. But it had two problems. First, its text was
a marvel of statutory gobbledygook, dependent upon three sets of
impenetrable, nested (interlocking) definitions for its most basic
concepts. 130  Second and more important, the computer industry-
apparently alone-had foreseen its own importance in the coming
digital revolution and had secured for itself subtle but definite
exemptions from key definitions, taking general-purpose computers
outside the entire statutory scheme. 131 Along came the Internet
124. See H.R. Rep. No. 873, Part I, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (Sept. 17, 1992), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3583 (original bill, consisting of fifty-seven pages plus thirty-seven
page "Technical Reference Document" describing serial copying control technology, was
reduced to twenty-eight pages).
125. See id.
126. See generally DRATLER IP, supra note 121, at § 6.01 [5][f].
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) ("No person shall import, manufacture, or distribute any
digital audio recording device or digital audio interface device that does not conform to"
required serial copying control technology). See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(2) ("A 'digital audio
interface device' is any machine or device that is designed specifically to communicate digital
audio information and related interface data to a digital audio recording device through a
nonprofessional interface.").
129. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-1007, discussed in DRATLER IP, supra note 121, at §
6.01 [5][f][ii], [iii].
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001, discussed in DRATLER IP, supra note 121, at § 6.01[5][fl[i].
131. Perhaps the key limiting definition is that of "digital audio recording device," which
must be, inter alia and with certain exceptions, "designed and marketed for the primary purpose
of, and [be] capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use[.]" 17 U.S.C. §
1001(3). Since general-purpose computer equipment is not designed and marketed for that
primary purpose, it falls outside the definition. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1014, 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding, for purposes of affirming preliminary
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revolution, which now relies on general-purpose computers to record,
store, transmit, and copy musical files (among others), and the 1992
Act almost instantaneously became obsolete. 132 It remains on the
books as a monument to the futility of technology-specific copyright
legislation and a trap for the unwary. 133
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is now,
perhaps, in the process of revealing itself as a second example of this
kind. 134 Unfortunately, important parts of the statute are so complex
and so badly drafted that it takes an entire book to do justice to its
flaws.
For present purposes, however, we can focus generally on the
DMCA's two primary legal innovations: (1) the anti-circumvention
and two anti-trafficking rules of Section 1201;135 and (2) the attempts
to provide a limited "safe harbor" from liability for Internet service
providers in Section 512.136 Both are relevant to the subject of
secondary liability for copyright infringement.
injunction, that computer hard drives are not covered devices, and therefore Section 1008 does
not immunize copying digital musical files onto them); Recording Indus. Ass'n. of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) ("under the plain meaning
of the ... definition of digital audio recording devices, computers (and their hard drives) are not
digital audio recording devices because their 'primary purpose' is not to make digital audio
copied recordings.") (citation omitted). Another key definition, "digital audio copied-recording,"
has been interpreted as excluding MP3 files for reasons too complex to outline here. See
Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d at 1075, 1077, 1079, 1081 (concluding that musical MP3
files, whether on computer hard drives or downloaded from hard drives to portable MP3 players,
are not covered by 1992 Act).
The exclusions discussed above were hardly accidental. See Recording Indus. Ass'n
of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (analyzing
and quoting Senate Report and concluding that definition of "digital musical recordings" was
intended to cover only "objects in which songs are normally fixed" and that therefore "[t]here
are simply no grounds in either the plain language of the definition or in the legislative history
for interpreting the term... to include songs fixed on computer hard drives") (citing S. Rep. No.
102-294, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 9, 1992), reprinted in 1992 WL 133198 at *97 & n.36,
*118-19).
132. For further discussion of this point, see DRATLER IP, supra note 12 1, at § 6.01[5][f][i].
133. 1 have described this situation as a statutory "meltdown,"and indeed it is: the statutory
mechanism no longer operates but has left a residue of radioactive waste to threaten future
litigants for years to come. See id.
134. For those interested in its details, I have written a one-volume treatise on the subject.
See DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, esp. § 2.05[2][c][iii].
135. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (anti-circumvention rule: "No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title"); 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l) (anti-trafficking rules), discussed in DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra
note 38, at § 2.05.
136. 17 U.S.C. § 512, discussed in DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at ch. 6.
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Section 1201 prohibits both breaking technological "locks" on
copyrighted works and providing others with the means to do so. 137 It
has, however, two rules against trafficking in the means to do so: one
for means to defeat technological controls on access to copyrighted
works, 138 and one for means to defeat controls on particular uses once
access has been achieved. 139 There is only one anti-circumvention
rule; it prohibits defeating technologies that control access to
copyrighted works. 140  Congress saw no need for an anti-
circumvention rule for use controls because unlicensed use of a
copyrighted work, absent an exception, may constitute copyright
infringement and can be sanctioned with normal, pre-existing
copyright remedies. 14 1 In contrast, copyright has never prohibited
unauthorized access to copyrighted works, so a new rule was needed
to prohibit breaking technological locks to gain unauthorized
access. 142
I have written extensively about the bad drafting and
unnecessary complexity of these rules and the consequent uncertainty
and cost of applying them. 143 I won't repeat that critique here. What
matters here is the road not taken: the statute's goals could have been
achieved far more simply, cheaply, comprehensibly and efficiently by
invoking federal common-law theories of secondary liability.
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (anticircumvention rule of Section 1201(a)(1)(A)); 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) ("No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that"
is designed, produced, used or marketed for the purpose of breaking locks on copyrighted
works) (identical language insofar as quoted).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (prohibiting trafficking in means to circumvent "a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a
work or a portion thereof"). For an explanation why such a technological measure is a use
control and what that means, see DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, § 2.05[2][a].
140. See supra note 135.
141. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (May 11, 1998):
[The reason for the different objects of subsections (a) and (b) is the same as the]
reason there is no prohibition on conduct in 1201(b) akin to the prohibition on
circumvention conduct in 1201(a)(1). The prohibition in 1201(a)(l) is necessary
because prior to this Act, the conduct of circumvention was never before made
unlawful. The device limitation [i.e., anti-trafficking rule] in 1201 (a)(2) enforces
this new prohibition on conduct. The copyright law has long forbidden copyright
infringements, so no new prohibition was necessary.
142. See id. For elaboration of this point, see DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at §
2.07[l].
143. See DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at preface (in general), §§ 2.05[2][c][iii],
3.02 (discussing Section 1201), § 6.03[3] (discussing Section 512).
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With respect to use controls under subsection (b) of Section
1201, Congress might have avoided any complex enactment at all.
Use of a copyrighted work outside the scope of the copyright owner's
authorization (if it invades the statutory exclusive rights) is copyright
infringement, whether achieved by defeating a technological
protective measure or otherwise. A person who supplies means to
defeat a technological use control and thereby to facilitate unlicensed
and infringing use may be secondarily liable for copyright
infringement under pre-existing doctrines of secondary liability.
Therefore Congress could have refrained entirely from enacting
subsection (b) of Section 1201, as well as those portions of several
complex exceptions that relate to subsection (b). If Congress had
wanted to belabor the obvious, it could have replaced all this dense
statutory prose with two simple sentences:
A person who provides another with means for defeating a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a
copyright holder may be liable for infringement of copyright that
results from the use of such means. A court may impose liability,
and may grant relief as for copyright infringement, when
appropriate under federal-common-law doctrines of secondary
liability.
Congressional reports then could have explained that the term
"secondary liability" is an all-encompassing term including vicarious
liability, contributory infringement, and inducement to infringe.
The case of subsection (a)(2) of Section 1201, which imposes an
anti-trafficking rule for access controls, is a bit more complex, but not
much. 144 A rule to prevent circumvention of access-control devices
had to be specially enacted because copyright had never before
controlled access, 145 even to copyright contraband. 146 Congress
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (prohibiting trafficking in means for "circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title").
145. Neither the word "access" nor any word fairly construed as including that concept
appears in the list of copyright holders' exclusive rights in 17 U.S.C. § 106. See also Khandji v.
Keystone Resorts Mgmt., Inc., 140 F.R.D. 697, 700-01 (D. Col. 1992):
The Copyright Act ... says nothing about an exclusive right to possession of a
copyrighted work. Plaintiffs' counsel voluntarily sent the brochure to defense
counsel without attempting in advance to secure any agreement on its return.
Plaintiffs' counsel has cited no authority for the proposition that the Copyright
Act requires defense counsel to return what was given to him, nor has research
uncovered any such authority. Plaintiffs' counsel already has voluntarily
provided a copy of the brochure and may not now seek assistance from this Court
in recapturing it.
United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 243 (5th Cir. 1982) (stolen-property case):
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enacted that rule in present subsection (a)(1)(a) of Section 1201,147
and it is by far the simplest and most straightforward rule in all of the
DMCA. It is a blanket and absolute prohibition on breaking
technological "locks", such as encryption and password protection
that control access to copyrighted works. Yet here again, for the
derivative rule prohibiting trafficking in circumvention technology,
Congress could have relied by analogy on tried and true notions of
secondary liability, which the Sony Court characterized as active "in
virtually all areas of the law." 148 That enactment again would have
required only two simple sentences:
A person who provides another with means for defeating a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a
copyrighted work may be liable for circumvention of that measure
or for any infringement of copyright that results from the use of
such means. A court may impose liability, and may grant relief as
for copyright infringement, when appropriate under federal-
common-law doctrines of secondary liability.
Congress, however, did not take this simple course. It thus failed
to emphasize the conceptual origins of trafficking liability as, in
essence, a form of secondary liability for copyright infringement (or
for circumvention of protective measures, which may lead to
infringement). Instead, Congress drafted a statute of unholy and
wholly unnecessary complexity with exceptions that are often
impenetrable and occasionally inconsistent in important respects. To
the extent it has not focused on constitutional arguments extraneous to
the statutory scheme, 149 litigation so far has focused on the meaning
of circumvention and the technological differences between
subsection (a) access controls and subsection (b) use controls. 150
These issues alone have caused enough confusion and uncertainty as
to make one wonder what will happen when the courts begin to
interpret and apply Section 1201's narrowly drafted but impenetrable
The copyright owners not only had no interest in the tangible video cassettes that
contained copies of the works, but they did not have the exclusive right to
possess or authorize possession of video cassettes containing copies of the
works.... At most, the [unlawful] distribution denied the copyright owners the
privilege of controlling distribution, which is an incorporeal, intangible right.
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (permitting importation of piratical copies into the United
States as long as they are single copies intended "for the private use of the importer" or
contained in his or her "personal baggage").
147. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), quoted supra note 135.
148. See supra text accompanying note 36.
149. See DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at §§ 2.05[2][c][iii], 2.10.
150. See id. at § 2.05[a], [b].
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exceptions. When they do, the industries that proposed the DMCA to
Congress will wish they had taken the simpler and cleaner common-
law course.
An early failure of another part of the DMCA also suggests the
accuracy of this prediction. Section 512, which purports to create a
"safe harbor" from inappropriate copyright-infringement liability for
Internet service providers, is, like other recent copyright amendments,
drafted in technology-dependent form. 151 Section 512 is relevant to
the present discussion because it provides a safe harbor from both
primary and secondary liability.152 It divides service providers'
relevant activities into four general, abstract categories, which can be
characterized roughly as routing, caching, posting and linking. 153 The
four key subsections thus seek to divide all Internet service-now and
forever-into these four separate categories of technological
operations, based on common modes of operation used on the Internet
today.
Like all technology-dependent language in an era of explosive
technological change, this approach has a key flaw-because it is
based upon the Internet's modes of operation now, it has little
flexibility to accommodate inevitable future change. In an effort to
make their descriptions of these four activities (routing, caching,
posting and linking) sound and seem general, the drafters of Section
512 described those activities in abstract, recursive clauses
reminiscent of the Internal Revenue Code. 154 The result, however,
was not what they intended. The limitations to current technology are
still demonstrably there, at least to persons familiar with the
151. 17 U.S.C. § 512; see generally DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at § 6.03[3].
152. See H.R. Rep. No. 796, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 73 (Oct. 8, 1998) (Conference
Report: "The limitations in subsections (a) through (d) [of Section 512] protect qualifying
service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory
infringement.... These subsections also limit injunctive relief against qualifying service
providers to the extent specified in subsection (j)"); H.R. Rep. No. 551, Part II, 105th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 50 (July 22, 1998) ("The limitations in subsections (a) through (d) [of Section 512]
protect qualifying service providers from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and
contributory infringement"). See also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6243 at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Subsection 512(a) exempts qualifying service providers
from monetary liability for direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement and limits injunctive
relief to the degree specified in subparagraph 512(j)(1)(B).").
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), discussed in DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at §
6.03[l][a]; 17 U.S.C. § 512(b), discussed in DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at §
6.03[1][b]; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), discussed in DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at §
6.03[2][a]; 17 U.S.C. § 512(d), discussed in DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at §
6.03[2][b].
154. For criticism of the drafting and its internal inconsistencies and other peccadillos, see
DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at § 6.03 [3].
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technology. Yet the statute's airy and multiply-recursive language
makes it hard slogging even for those who already know how the
technology works, and virtually impenetrable for those who do not.
As an experiment, I have spent an entire class session of roughly one
and a half hours on one of the four subsections--caching 55 -and,
despite my best teaching efforts, have left class wondering whether
even my brightest students had a clue about the legal issues that the
statutory language raises, let alone how the governed technology
addressed normally operates. At the very least, a statute like that
seems to violate a basic constitutional norm requiring the law to be
accessible to people of ordinary intelligence. 156
Careful readers will note that the statute's list of four Internet
activities-routing, caching, posting and linking--does not contain
peer-to-peer file sharing (P2P). Although P2P often involves one of
the listed activities-routing-it hardly can be characterized as falling
decisively in any of the four statutory categories. 157 As a result, two
federal circuit courts have now ruled that Section 512(h)'s special
subpoena power does not permit copyright holders to glean the
identities of alleged P2P copyright infringers from their Internet
service providers when those providers serve only routing
functions. 158 Think of that: two courts have ruled that a statute
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (statutory "safe harbor" for caching).
156. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926):
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant
alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
For a more modem affirmation of this point, see United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265-66
(1997) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)) (discussing three aspects of
"fair warning" requirement enunciated by Justice Holmes and noting need for criminal statutes
to give "fair warning ... in language that the common world will understand, of what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line
should be clear").
It bears emphasis that commercial copyright infringement is a criminal offense, and
there is no explicit exception for secondary liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (misdemeanors); 18
U.S.C. § 2319 (felonies).
157. Although peer-to-peer file sharing does not require a central server, it does use file
transmission through the Internet, which normally uses independent routing services, unless the
transmitter and recipient are on the same local network or very close together. See DRATLER
CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at § 6.05[2][a] (explaining operation of Internet).
158. See In re Charter Commc'ns., Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 777
(8th Cir. 2005) (following Recording Indus. Ass'n. of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet
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designed specifically not to allow Internet infringers to hide
anonymously behind their service providers fails to apply in precisely
the situation in which a special subpoena power is now most
needed. 159 Although the statutory purpose was clear, its text was
murky and impenetrable and led in the opposite direction, and the two
courts ruled that text trumps intent. 160 One might say this result meted
out poetic justice for an industry that played a leading role in drafting
such an execrably impenetrable statute, but that would be unkind.
Perhaps this result was inevitable in this narrow instance, for the
drafters of Section 512(h) were trying to do something that common
law had never contemplated. They were trying to specify a set of
circumstances so narrow that a court clerk could constitutionally issue
a subpoena to reveal infringers' identities, as a nondiscretionary,
ministerial act, even before litigation began. 161 Perhaps that effort
was doomed to failure for a complex of constitutional and prudential
reasons. 162 Yet the demise of Section 512(h) stands as an early
warning to Congress and lobbyists of the wages of the sin of pride:
thinking they can predict technology's future, or imagining that
technology will stay put.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster may serve
as something of a watershed. For about fifteen years, we who till the
copyright field have seen the horrendous consequences of industry
participants taking their alleged grievances prematurely to Congress,
which then rubber-stamps legislation voluminously and execrably
drafted by dueling lobbyists as a sort of industry-wide settlement
agreement. Anyone who thinks that the Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992, the "webcasting" amendments to Section 114, or the Digital
Services, Inc., infra); Recording Indus. Ass'n. of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services,
Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Verizon III).
159. For elaboration of this conundrum, see DRATLER CYBERLAW, supra note 38, at §
6.0512][b].
160. See sources cited supra note 158.
161. Section 512(h) contemplates subpoenas issued by a court clerk, before or after
litigation. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1) ("A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the
owner's behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a subpoena to a
service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in accordance with this subsection");
17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(C) (application for subpoena requires, inter alia, "a sworn declaration to
the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged
infringer and that such information will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under
this title").
162. See DRATLERCYBERLAW, supra note 38, at § 6.05[11].
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Millennium Copyright Act have made copyright law or liability more
certain and predictable and its determination less costly simply hasn't
been paying attention. 163 The Grokster decision offers a new
approach: let the courts handle emerging issues as a matter of federal
common law, just as the Supreme Court did in Grokster. If we give
the courts a chance, we may find that the resulting rules are clearer,
more certain, more timely, more comprehensible (and therefore more
acceptable to the public), and more durable than anything Congress
has done in the field of copyright in the last two decades.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Grokster shows
what common-law courts can do if given a chance. The parties and
numerous amici deluged the Court with detail and argument on
everything from empirical studies of losses in the music industry,
through lists of new technologies that copyright producers had or had
not tried to suppress, or that might arise in the future, to economic
analyses of innovation and the venture capital that supports it. There
were enough red herrings to supply a fish-canning factory. But the
Court saw through to the essence of the case: credible evidence that
these defendants, in this case, had deliberately, consciously and
systematically built their business on others' massive infringement of
copyright. Not surprisingly, the Court let that claim go to trial, and it
did so unanimously, deftly avoiding all the interesting, but abstract
and largely irrelevant, questions that the parties and so many amici
had posed.
Isn't this what common-law courts are for-to separate the
wheat from the chaff and make decisions that average men and
women can understand and appreciate? If we encourage such a
reversion to federal common law, if we give the courts the evidence
they need, if we focus on real economic and business issues, rather
than irrelevant abstractions posed by badly drafted statutes or
unenduring attempts to describe current technology or existing
precedent in abstract terms, I think we will be astounded at how
quickly certainty and predictability in copyright law will increase and
how precipitously transaction costs will fall. The question remains
whether the legal profession really desires that result.
163. 17 U.S.C. Ch. 10, §§ 1001-1010 (Audio Home Recording Act), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 122-133; 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)-(j) (webcasting amendments).
